Security hardening: rate limiting, atomic locks, origin check, honest docs

API / Security:
- Add api/_helpers.php: shared send_security_headers(), verify_origin(),
  get_hmac_secret(), check_rate_limit(), read_json_locked(), write_json_locked()
- shorten.php: remove Access-Control-Allow-Origin:*, restrict to same-origin,
  rate-limit 20 req/h per IP, atomic JSON read+lock, HMAC secret from file
- verify.php: rate-limit GET (30/min) and POST (10/h) per IP, atomic lock,
  prevent overwriting existing proofs, origin check on POST
- node.php: fix rate limit from 1000 to 60 req/min, add security headers,
  origin check
- check-short.php: add security headers, re-derive signature server-side
- s.php: use file-based HMAC secret via get_hmac_secret(), hash_equals()
  for timing-safe comparison

Service Worker:
- sw.js: navigation requests (mode=navigate) never served from cache;
  network-first with offline fallback to prevent stale invoice state

Documentation (honest claims):
- README: tagline "No backend" -> "No tracking"; new Architecture table
  listing exactly what server sees for each feature; Security Model section
- index.html: meta description and footer updated from "No Backend" to
  "Minimal Backend"
- i18n.js footer: already updated in previous commit
This commit is contained in:
Alexander Schmidt
2026-03-26 07:13:02 +01:00
parent 7e325abf7d
commit 2c3a8a0584
9 changed files with 194 additions and 59 deletions

View File

@@ -1,30 +1,34 @@
<?php
<?php
require_once __DIR__ . '/_helpers.php';
/**
* TX Proof Storage API
* POST: Store verified payment proof for an invoice
* GET: Retrieve payment status for an invoice
*
* Privacy note: Only stores TX hash, amount, and confirmations.
* Payee address is NOT stored — verification happens client-side only.
* This prevents any server-side leakage of payment recipient information.
*
* Privacy: Only TX hash, amount, and confirmations are stored.
* Payee address is NEVER stored — verification happens client-side only.
*/
header('Content-Type: application/json');
send_security_headers();
$dbFile = __DIR__ . '/../data/proofs.json';
$proofs = [];
if (file_exists($dbFile)) {
$proofs = json_decode(file_get_contents($dbFile), true) ?: [];
}
// GET: Retrieve proof
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'GET') {
if (!check_rate_limit('verify_get', 30, 60)) {
http_response_code(429);
echo json_encode(['error' => 'Rate limit exceeded']);
exit;
}
$code = $_GET['code'] ?? '';
if (empty($code) || !preg_match('/^[a-z0-9]{4,10}$/', $code)) {
echo json_encode(['verified' => false]);
exit;
}
$proofs = file_exists($dbFile) ? (json_decode(file_get_contents($dbFile), true) ?: []) : [];
if (isset($proofs[$code])) {
echo json_encode(array_merge(['verified' => true], $proofs[$code]));
} else {
@@ -40,6 +44,14 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] !== 'POST') {
exit;
}
verify_origin();
if (!check_rate_limit('verify_post', 10, 3600)) {
http_response_code(429);
echo json_encode(['error' => 'Rate limit exceeded']);
exit;
}
$input = json_decode(file_get_contents('php://input'), true);
if (!$input) {
http_response_code(400);
@@ -64,7 +76,7 @@ if (!preg_match('/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/', $txHash)) {
exit;
}
// Verify the short URL code exists
// Verify the short URL code exists (read-only, no lock needed here)
$urlsFile = __DIR__ . '/../data/urls.json';
if (!file_exists($urlsFile)) {
http_response_code(404);
@@ -78,7 +90,17 @@ if (!isset($urls[$code])) {
exit;
}
// Store proof
// Store proof with atomic lock
[$fp, $proofs] = read_json_locked($dbFile);
// Don't overwrite an already-verified proof
if (isset($proofs[$code])) {
flock($fp, LOCK_UN);
fclose($fp);
echo json_encode(['ok' => true]);
exit;
}
$proofs[$code] = [
'tx_hash' => strtolower($txHash),
'amount' => $amount,
@@ -86,5 +108,6 @@ $proofs[$code] = [
'verified_at' => time()
];
file_put_contents($dbFile, json_encode($proofs, JSON_PRETTY_PRINT));
write_json_locked($fp, $proofs);
echo json_encode(['ok' => true]);